The Channel Fleet and the Blockade of Brest, 1793-1801

‘The Channel Fleet and the Blockade of Brest, 1793 – 1801’, edited by Roger Morriss, based in part on transcripts made by Richard Saxby. The Channel fleet was Great Britain’s first line of defence against invasion throughout the French Revolutionary War but it was also responsible for protecting her trade in home waters and for preventing the French Brest fleet from escaping either to mount an expedition, protect French convoys, succour French colonies or reinforce the French fleet in the Mediterranean or in other allied ports . The strategy within which the Channel fleet operated, the central government bureaucracy which directed it and the terms upon which its Commanders-in-Chief managed the fleet and hence the blockade of Brest itself only evolved as the war proceeded. This volume had its origins in transcripts of extracts from documents made by Richard Saxby whose aim was to provide a prequel to the two volumes dealing with the blockade of Brest between 1803 and 1805 which had been edited by John Leyland and published by the Society in 1899 and 1902. Saxby died before he could complete his task and it fell to Roger Morriss both to revise the work for publication and to extend its scope. As a result the documents begin in June 1793 when the Channel fleet was placed on a war footing and instructions were given to the Commander-in-Chief to proceed ‘to the westward’ and cover the whole of the operational period of the war. Moreover documents relating to actual operations are supplemented by further letters, instructions and reports throwing light on how those operations were sustained. In the early period of the war the perceived weakness of the French fleet suggested that blockade was not immediately necessary and the protection of trade was the priority, with only occasional observations made of the force in Brest. By the end of the period and particularly after St Vincent had been appointed Commander-in-Chief, close blockade had become the principal means of demonstrating Britain’s determination to oppose French arms by the most extreme measures once the whole of Europe had fallen under French control. How that was achieved year after year in both winter and summer and without the fleet seeking shelter from extreme weather in Cawsand Bay or Tor Bay as in earlier years is the subtext of this volume. The establishment of an effective method of feeding and watering the fleet off Brest and of maintaining its health, principally through the provision of lemon juice as a preventive against scurvy, were the key factors in enabling the blockade to be maintained. Indeed, it was in the establishment of the necessary administrative infrastructure to sustain the blockade of Brest that its real achievement lay.