Allies at Odds

America, Europe, and Vietnam, 19611968

By (author) Eugenie M. Blang

Not available to order

Publication date:

16 April 2011

Length of book:

286 pages

Publisher

Rowman & Littlefield Publishers

ISBN-13: 9781442209237

Allies at Odds examines America's Vietnam policy from 1961 to 1968 in an international context by focusing on the United States' relationship with its European partners France, West Germany, and Great Britain. The European response to America's Vietnam policy provides a framework to assess this important chapter in recent American history within the wider perspective of international relations. Equally significant, the respective approaches to the "Vietnam question" by the Europeans and Americans reveal the ongoing challenge for nation-states of transcending narrowly defined state-centered policies for a global perspective pursuant of common goals among the trans-Atlantic allies. Blang explores the failure of France, West Germany, and Great Britain to significantly influence American policy-making.

Introduction
Chapter 1: The United States and the Vietnam Conundrum
Chapter 2: France and Indochina
Chapter 3: West Germany from the 1950s to 1963: Finding a Role in International Affairs
Chapter 4: Britain and Indochina: We Have Experience in These Matters
Chapter 5: Lyndon Johnson and Military Escalation in Vietnam, 1964–1968
Chapter 6: De Gaulle's Response to American Policy in Vietnam, 1961–1966
Chapter 7: Ludwig Erhard: Bonn, Washington, Paris, and the Problem of Vietnam, 1964–1966
Chapter 8: Harold Wilson and the Elusive Search for a Diplomatic Settlement
Chapter 9: The Lessening of Tensions, 1968–1969
Conclusion
Epilogue: The Allies and the Iraq War

Blang draws skillfully on archival material from the Kennedy and Johnson presidential libraries and on numerous published collections of U.S., French, German, and British documents....Blang’s focus on bilateral diplomacy at the highest level helps her craft an admirably clear central argument: The British, French, and West German governments opposed American escalation in Vietnam for reasons stemming from their distinctive national outlooks, historical experiences, and geopolitical goals.