The Supreme Court against the Criminal Jury
Social Science and the Palladium of Liberty
By (author) John A. Murley, Sean D. Sutton
Publication date:
11 June 2014Length of book:
140 pagesPublisher
Lexington BooksISBN-13: 9780739136218
The Supreme Court against the Criminal Jury: Social Science and the Palladium of Liberty is an analysis of the United States Supreme Court decisions in what has come to be called the “jury-size” and “jury-decision rule” cases. In Williams v. Florida (1970) and Ballew v. Georgia (1978), a majority of the Supreme Court looked to history, empirical studies, and functional analysis to support its claim that there was “no discernible difference” between the verdicts of juries of six and juries of twelve. In the process the Court also decided that the number twelve was an historical accident and that the twelve-member jury was not an essential ingredient of trial by jury.
Two years later, the Court, following essentially the same line of reasoning used in Williams, decided in the companion cases Apodaca v. Oregon (1972) and Johnson v. Louisiana (1972) that defendants were as well served with juries that reached verdicts by a majority vote of 11-1,10-2 and 9-3 as they were with unanimous jury verdicts. In these cases the Supreme Court rejected the centuries old common law view that the unanimous jury verdict was an essential element of trial by jury. With these four decisions, the criminal jury as it had been known for more than six hundred years under the common law and the Constitution was in principle abandoned. We critique these decisions from the perspective of unreliable jury studies and the impact of these decision on jury nullification.
Two years later, the Court, following essentially the same line of reasoning used in Williams, decided in the companion cases Apodaca v. Oregon (1972) and Johnson v. Louisiana (1972) that defendants were as well served with juries that reached verdicts by a majority vote of 11-1,10-2 and 9-3 as they were with unanimous jury verdicts. In these cases the Supreme Court rejected the centuries old common law view that the unanimous jury verdict was an essential element of trial by jury. With these four decisions, the criminal jury as it had been known for more than six hundred years under the common law and the Constitution was in principle abandoned. We critique these decisions from the perspective of unreliable jury studies and the impact of these decision on jury nullification.
In four much-criticized 1970s cases, the Supreme Court abandoned tradition and held that states may use criminal juries with fewer than 12 members or juries that decide by less than unanimity, though not both simultaneously. Does it matter? Are smaller or nonunanimous juries not good at protecting citizens from corrupt, biased, or overzealous officials? Researchers conducted numerous studies using a variety of social-science methods. Their findings were equivocal. But by the 1990s, it was clear that the new juries did not save as much public money as expected; few states made much use of them, so scholarly attention waned. Murley and Sutton take the conservative position that before abandoning tradition, the court should have proved that the new juries were not inferior, and the authors argue correctly that the court did not. They assert that the new rule ‘tilts the jury trial in favor of the government’ by discouraging jury nullification. . . . Indeed, nullification may be increasing. The jury is still out on the impact of using smaller or nonunanimous juries. Summing Up: Recommended. Upper-division undergraduate, graduate, and research collections.